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1RECOVERY AND ADJUSTMENT FOR ALL: OR CONTINUING 
COMMON CRISIS?
By Reginald Herbold Green
This failure to understand the enormous economic 
potential of less wealthy developing countries both as 
markets and as suppliers is compounded by two further 
misconceptions. The first is to see existing economic 
and financial arrangements as essentially healthy and 
adequate ... The next misconception is to pin the blame 
for the world’s economic malaise on OPEC ....
Edward Heath, 19811
We too often forget that even today the depth of human 
suffering is immense. Every two seconds of this year a 
child will die of hunger or disease.
2Willy Brandt, Common Crisis, 1983
Now, against a backdrop of global economic recession, 
the outlook for all less-developed nations - but 
especially for the sub-Saharan region - is grim.
3World Bank, Accelerated Development, 1981
....Fragments of our lost kingdom ...
Here the stone images
Are raised, here they receive
The supplication of a dead man’s hand
Under the twinkle of a fading star.
- T. S. Eliot, The Hollow Men
2Recovery For All: The Case and The Doubts
The 1979-82 recession is over. The 1969-82 low growth decade is past. A 
new golden age like 19^5—69 is about to dawn on the world economy. That is 
the basic thrust of the Williamsburg Summit and of the 1983 World Bank and 
IMF reports - admittedly in somewhat more subdued and qualified terms - and 
even more of the publicists of neo-liberalism as exemplified by the present 
USA and UK administrations.
There certainly is a case for this set of contentions. The USA has returned 
to significant growth and 5% growth in 1984 seems likely. The UK has ended 
its 1979-82 negative growth. In Western Europe recovery seems to be taking 
hold, e.g. 2.3 to 3% 1984 projections for Federal Germany. Debt problems 
have remained manageable so far as the international banking system is 
concerned: no defaults, limited writeoffs, slow retrieval of past
commitments to second and third world borrowers is claimed to be in sight. 
International trade has in 1983 not repeated its 1982 volume decline (the 
first since the end of the Second World War). Major open outbreaks of 
protectionism have been averted.
Admittedly the recovery is, so this case goes, not yet general. Some ldc's
- notably the "four small tigers", Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Hong 
4Kong - do appear to be entering into recovery but most remain in recession. 
However, as OECD recovery continues and global trade expands there will be 
opportunity for them to benefit too, if.... If they follow the inflation 
choking, government budget (or at least government borrowing) cutting, 
privatisation strategy espoused by the IMF, UK, USA - and less full 
bloodedly by the World Bank - for universal consumption and if they increase 
inducements to foreign private investment. Then there will be exports,
3credit and growth for all well managed economies.
Fortunately, or unfortunately, this case has severe limits on what it is 
likely to deliver in its own terms and also a set of assumptions which seem, 
at the least, highly optimistic.
Recovery from the depressed levels of 1982 - with an average under­
utilisation of capital stock of at least 25Í and unemployment of labour of 
10% for developed market economies as a group - is one thing; generalised, 
sustained 3 to growth is quite another. The 1983 recovery is, to date, 
weaker than that of 1976-78 and, on the face of it, has no greater life 
expectancy. Further, even at 3 to 4%, it seems most unlikely either to 
reduce unemployment significantly or to restore basic industries to anything 
approaching capacity operation, e.g. for the first 10 months, 1983 steel 
output in the industrial market economies and third world is below 1982,
5recovery or no recovery. Thus neither optimism about the duration of the 
present recovery nor any claims that it is general globally, sectorally or 
in relation to unemployment and low income groups have any real empirical 
basis.
That raises some doubts as to how effective a stimulus to world trade 
recovery will be - especially if limited in duration and never very dramatic 
as to percentage growth. The new protectionism - with up to half of global 
trade covered by non-tariff restrictions usually disguised as agreements - 
is not likely to be rolled back while unemployment and unused plant capacity 
remain high, e.g. the rising clamour for full scale protectionism of a type 
likely to trigger a protectionist trade war by US steel companies.^1 This is 
a rather serious drawback in terms of the US-UK-IMF-IBRD approach since that 
treats renewed growth of world trade as a central driving force for
4sustained growth.
The banking system’s safety hinges on the rate of sustained trade growth and 
particularly that of third (and second) world exports. (Or alternatively on 
banks’ willingness and ability to increase exposure sharply.) The new 
protectionism, the sluggish first world recovery and the very limited third 
world signs of recovery at the least pose some question markets and at worst 
are close to the ghosts of the Kredit Anstalt and the 1929-32 international 
banking collapses knocking at the door.
The South can hardly apply the IMF-USA-UK prescription as now written and
contribute to a growth of world trade. Its export prospects are not good
either on primary products or - with a handful of exceptions - on
manufactures. High interest rates and reduction of bank exposure will,
therefore, be plausible only if one assumes adjustment by contraction not
growth. Even if normatively acceptable, this approach is not necessarily
7either socially, politically or technically feasible.
"Rage, rage against the dying of the light...”
The cost of the recessison has already been high - particularly for poor
people and most particularly for poor people in poor countries. Whatever 
ones views on the virtues of zero growth in moderately affluent societies it 
is a recipe for continued inequality and suffering in poor ones. If it is 
argued that redistribution from North to South could combine zero growth
with meeting basic human needs, the practical answer is that the South would 
be certifiably insane to count on the North doing any such a thing and that 
growing unemployment and poverty in the North are hardly likely to increase
5the practicability of global redistribution to the poor in North or South. 
In fairness advocates of zero growth do not, by and large, propose that it 
be acheived by failed growth-manship.
O
The first Brandt Report, Programme For Survival etches the nature and 
extent of absolute poverty clearly. Since then the situation has worsened. 
The economic data are numbing - and hard to visualise in human terms. 
Recent ILO Basic Needs studies on Zambia and Tanzania and UNICEF’s State of 
the World’s Children Report 1983  ^ are perhaps more effective in that 
respect. Two quite poor countries (Zambia, Tanzania1^) that over the 1960’s 
and early 1970’s had achieved rising life expectancies, falling infant and 
child mortality, sharply improved health and education systems plus access 
to pure water, increased average nutritional standards, rising real wages 
and - at least in the case of Tanzania - rising real peasant incomes and 
declines in intra urban, intra rural and urban-rural inequality, have been 
brought to the verge of disintegration. Whatever view one takes of the 
defects in domestic policy, the vertiginous decline in their terms of trade 
combined, especially in the case of Tanzania, with 1973-1983 declines in 
real aid per capita are at the base of the ”turnaround”. In both cases real 
per capita consumption has declined at least 30Í since the mid-1970’s and 
the quality of basic social services - especially health and access to pure 
water - has declined so greatly that their serviceability is clearly called 
into question.
UNICEF1"1 relates these and similar data from North and South to one of the 
most vulnerable groups - children. The basic data on morbidity, mortality 
and nutrition do not need much imagination to convert to pictures of actual 
and potential suffering and death. There is an appalling danger of 
widespread reversal of the trend fall in infant and child mortality, partly
6because resources have become scarcer in general and partly because social 
services (and usually social services for the poor in particular) have faced 
disproportionate real cuts in resource availability.
The availability of such data and their relative lack of influence on public
policy illustrate one of the major costs of the recession - the decline in
human compassion and vision. In the North the "acceptable" rate of
unemployment (now seen as "necessary" or even as functionally useful) has
moved from a 2% - 4/6 range in the 1960’s to 8% - *\0%. At the same time
safety nets for the poor - including the newly unemployed and the never
12employed school leavers - have been cut. "Absolute poverty eradication"
and "basic human needs" are no longer operational slogans or objectives even
at the World Bank, much less for most industrial economies either nationally
or globally. "Redistribution with growth" has perished as a strategy along
with growth. In the South as well "what we have we hold" and "each for
himself and the devil take the hindmost" have gained strength as organizing
principles among a majority of social groups, sub-classes and states.
Voices advocating combining practical routes toward recovery with lesser
inequality have not merely not been influential, they have not had a serious
13hearing, vide the Brandt Report to cite only the best known.
1970-82 and 1979-82; The Road Behind
The 1979-82 depression was marked by the worst overall performance of the
world economy since the early 1930’s. However, it would be unrealistic to
view it out of context as marking a sudden break from a basically
14satisfactory economic trend.
71945-59 was a most unusual period in terms of global economic history. For 
a quarter century there was sustained expansion of world output and trade - 
with spurts and slowdowns but with no sustained lags. Over that period the 
recipe of reducing trade barriers and fostering international trade, using 
the US dollar as the basic international reserve asset, operating a fixed 
exchange rate systsem with fairly infrequent devaluations, using limited IMF 
finance to meet temporary payment crises, increasing real resource transfers 
to poor countries via bilateral and multilateral aid bodies and - for the 
less poor - export credits and bank loans and using Keynesian fiscal 
policies to prevent depressions or long lasting recessions worked. It is 
perfectly true that gains were unequally divided even among industrial 
economies and for many Third World economies were negligible. However, in 
retrospect the first post World War II quarter century increasingly appears 
to have been a Golden Age.
The undermining of the system began in the 1960fs. The rate of growth of 
concessional transfers to Third World countries declined. The sustained use 
of Keynesian policies to limit recessions and unemployment created a set of 
expectations favourabale to inflation. Perhaps most critical, the need for 
additional international reserves to provide the liquidity for sustained 
trade expansion could only be supplied by sustained US external deficits 
while the dollar was a fully acceptable reserved asset only so long as it 
was seen to be safely backed by gold and immune from fluctuations in value 
compared to other currencies. Never permanently reconcileable, these two 
requirements clashed violently when the USA radically increased its external 
deficit by seeking to finance the Viet Nam war, increased anti-poverty 
spending and sustained foreign investment at the same time.
In the early 1970's the dollar went off the gold standard. The industrial
economies entered into booms at the same time leading to mutually 
reinforcing inflationary pressures. Crop failures - particularly in the 
USSR - sharply boosted world grain prices. The 1973-74 oil price increases 
were the culminataion in this series of shocks which brought an end to the 
Golden Age. 1974-75 were recession years globally and in the North and 
depression years for many Southern economies.
However, over 1974-75 international economic policy - and that of major 
industrial economies - sought to limit recession in length and depth and to 
restore growth. Domestic budgetary deficits, commercial bank recycling of 
funds and increased low ocnditionality International Monetary Fund 
facilities all played significant roles. 1976-78 were years comparable to 
the 1 9 6 0 ’s in growth of output and trade albeit with higher inflation rates 
and a lack of confidence in the stability of the international financial 
system which had not achieved any substitute for the stable convertible 
dollar/fixed exchange rate model.
Whether the 1979-80 oil price increases were the cause or the occasion for
industrial economy (and IMF) economic policy reversals is not self evident.
Reversals there were toward placing reduction of inflation before
maintenance of output and employment and defence of external balance before
continued pursuit of expanding global trade (a fairly natural consequence of
growing unemployment). The rise of monetarism as a fashionable economic
orthodoxy and the election of US and British governments committed to
reversal of Keynesianism and of welfare state trends (and not committed to
continued Third World development and economic expansion) postdate the
beginning of the 1979-82 depression but almost certainly contributed to its
16length and severity.
9This is particularly true of the policies of the Reagan administration. Its 
initial packagae of cutting basic government expenditure and the parallel 
Federal Reserve policy of tight money clearly led to immediate economic 
contraction and rising unemployment with a lagged result of lowering 
inflation. Combined with rather tepid opposition to the onward creep of the 
new protectionism and fervent opposition to low conditionality finance for 
Third World economies, this policy has played a substantial role in 
throttling down developing economy ouput and import growth which was a 
mitigating factor during the 1974-75 recession and a buoyant one during the 
1975-78 recovery.
The more recent claimed successes of the Reagan administration’s economic 
strategy are highly ambiguous. The decline in unemployment and the 
resurgence of growth in the USA are the result of massive budget deficits 
which represent an unintended reversion to (rather incautious) Keynesian 
demand stimulation as a result of failed ’’supply side" tax cutting and 
raising military spending. To limit the deficit, programmes to assist the 
poor - whether to survive or to stand again on their own feet - have been 
cut nationally and internationally.
To counteract the inflationary pressure inherent in huge fiscal deficits and
a decline in net saving from M% of national product in 1979 to about 14Í in 
171982 has required a monetary policy leading to high real interest rates 
and a massive inflow of foreign funds. One set of direct consequences has 
been to overvalue the dollar discouraging exports and encouraging imports 
leading to a growing US trade deficit requiring more external borrowing 
(and/ or foreign buying up of US companies) to cover the trade gap and 
thereby creating another necessity for high interest rates.
10
The high US real interest rates have had the effect of forcing up world
interest rate levels with severe contractionary (or recovery delaying and
limiting) effects in Europe and disastrous balance of payments and forced
contractionary 'adjustment* results for many Third World borrowers. For
example, Brazil has largely avoided an overvalued currency, usually
maintained a trade surplus but been pitched into an unmanageable external
deficit and a consequential forced domestic contraction dominantly by the
18increase of interest rates on its external debt.
The US trade deficit, in itself, does tend to stimulate recovery in Europe
but, in addition to the negative impact of high interest rates, it has -
together with continued depression in many heavy and other older industries
- unleashed protectionist forces which have interacted with those of Europe
and Japan to make a trade war a real possibility and a 'mutual' trade
19barrier raising among industrial nations almost inevitable This is
exacerbated by the desparate need of Third World economies to raise exports 
and to cut imports - both of which increase pressures for subsidizing 
European exports and raising barriers to entry of Third World products into 
European markets.
Further the apparent stablility of a large USA trade deficit countered (as
well as partly caused) by an overvalued exchange rate and high interest
rates to draw in foreign borrowing and investment is - quite apart from the
20risks it poses to domestic growth - desparately unstable. If lenders 
perceive the USA as a chronic debtor with a structural trade deficit they 
will abandon the dollar expecting it to sink relative to other currencies. 
If enough act on that prediction it will become self fulfilling and higher
real interest rates (especially with a continued huge deficit on government
and on trade account) may merely reinforce this negative image and cause a
11
panic flight from the dollar, the consequences of which both for world
economic growth (and especially that of the USA) and the viability of the
21overstretched global financial system would be very severe indeed.
It would, therefore, be quite unreasonable to cite the economic policies of 
the Reagan administration as the basic cause of the 1970-1982 period of low 
average growth or even as the initial causes of the 1979-82 depression. 
However, they have contributed to lengthening and deepening the depression 
and to the extent that (largely through their utter failure on the fiscal 
balance front) they have fuelled the 1983 recovery they have done so in ways 
which limit the breadth of that recovery outside the USA and render it 
radically unstable.
The North; Prospects for 1984 and After
Growth of Gross Domestic Product in industrial market economies in 1983 has
been about 2% and in 1984 will be in the 2.75 to 3-25Í range. The IMF,
22World Bank, OECD and UNCTAD are in rough agreement on that. Somewhat 
ominously UNCTAD, whose recent track record on projections is both best 
(least bad) and gloomiest is again the least optimistic. In short for a 
recovery after a severe depression the projected growth rates are low.
The IMF projections^ show distinct inequalities within the North (more 
acurately North-west) with the USA and Canada at 4.5 - 4.75/6, Japan at 3-5% 
and Western Europe at about 2%. These all represent improvements on 1982 
(which showed negative growth in the USA, Canada and several Western 
European economies) and 1983 but remain at or below population growth in 
several European cases. These disparities raise doubts as to how general
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and how sustainable the recovery will be. If it is to be fuelled by very 
rapid North American growth and rising North American trade deficits there 
are severe limitations on US ability or willingness to borrow without limit 
as to time or amounts.
The real divergence of estimates is on the longevity and stability of the 
recovery. UNCTAD sees a 2.9% potential medium term growth rate, possibly up 
to 3-5% during recovery and a lower - or erratic - probable actual rate 
around 2 . ^ % . 2h> The World Bank25 picks 3.7Í as its "central” rate through 
1990 but admits to the possibility of a 2.5% actual and hopes 5-0% might be 
attainable. Except for the last these are all well below the 1960-73 actual 
growth rate and some are barely above the 1973-80 2.5% record. All are
better than 1980-82’s disastrous 0.4Í but as that is the worst average since
the early 1930's such a comparison offers scant cause for optimism. As most 
analysis suggests that 3% sustained growth (more during recoveries from 
recessions) is needed to hold unemployment constant, most of these rates 
certainly offer no prospect of return to anything approaching full
employment even if that is taken to mean 5% unemployment.
Trade is, to date, lagging growth in the partial recovery. After a trend 6Í 
real growth over 19^5-73 (higher than GDP growth and, at least for 
industrial economies, at least one of the cylinders of growth), it grew 
erratically in the 1970's, basically stagnated in 1980 and 19 81 and fell 2% 
in 1982. For 1983» ominously, the volume apparently change little, i.e. 
remained at levels first achieved in 1979* Almost all of the sustained
recovery projections assume a dynamic role for world trade. The World 
Bank2  ^ and the IMF2  ^ make quite clear that increased protectionism would
2Qprobably snuff out recovery. GATT sees prices as so distorted
internationally and the foundations of the trade system over which it
13
presides as so eroded as to require major new initiatives to avoid both 
increased protectionism/decreased trade and blocked debtor exports/debt 
crises.
A further question mark over sustained recovery are historically record real 
interest rates (nominal rates less inflation) which are about 4$ for short 
and 8% for long term money. These levels are a major contributing factor to 
third world balance of payments problems (the dominant cause in several 
cases including Brazil) and a major deterrent to investment using borrowed 
funds in both North and South. They appear largely attributable to the 
incredible fiscal laxity of the Reagan Administration which presides over a 
budgetary gap which an IMF Mission to a Third World country would instantly 
characterize as the grossest of mismanagement. The fiscal laxity is 
consistent with falling inflation only with very high real interst rates 
(and unemployment) and a large balance of payments deficit. The impact on 
the availability and cost of capital to other economies and to their ability 
to operate reasonable (say 1 - 2% real or around the historic trend)
interest rates is severe.
The South: Prospects or Portents
For the South short term prospects are very uneven. GDP growth in 1983
seems likely to average 3Í with a near 5% rate in Asia offsetting the third
30negative outturn in a row for Latin America. Outside Asia for a majority 
of countries real GDP per capita has fallen since 1979 - dramatically in 
several cases.
1984 prospects are probably for a small improvement - including perhaps zero
14
or 1? growth in Latin America - if world trade picks up and there is no
further tightening of IMF/Commercial Bank lending. 1985-1990 prospects - on
the World Bank’s central projection^1"1 - are at or above 5% for all regions
and classes except the least developed and Sub-Saharan Africa where 3*5$ is
projected or approximately no change in GDP per capita over the period
following falls of 15 - 25% per capita over 1979-85. UNCTAD estimates are
32distinctly more pessimistic.
These projections assume-^ rapid growth of Third World exports, reversal or
at least no increase in protectionism against their manufactured goods, some
34improvement in terms of trade for primary products, a near fourfold 
nominal increase in developing country external debt (including concessional 
finance growth at the same rate) and three to fourfold increases in net 
commercial bank lending to and foreign long term investment in developing 
ocuntries. Taken separately each of these parameters seems at best a 50-50 
possibility. Taking them as six assumptions with a probability of .5 each 
gives an (admittedly crude) overall probability of 2% that the rates are 
attainable. The low growth scenario - which appears much more likely to be 
the actual one on current data even assuming sustained North growth 
averaging 3% - yields rates of growth averaging k.7% for all developing 
countries but well under 3% for Sub-Saharan Africa and least developed 
countries and barely above population growth for Latin America. It is - if 
anything - more dependent on increasing access to external finance, a result 
radically at variance with present and forseeable future commercial bank 
efforts to reuce exposure.
The external finance issue is crucial as is the level of real interest 
rates. Measured against the prices of developing economy exports the latter 
averaged over *\0% during 1980-1983. Net bank lending to developing
15
countries declined sharply in 1982 and further in 1983* Even in the case of
larger lenders - e.g. the Bank itself and the Commonwealth Development
Corporation^' - there has been very little increase in real disbursements
partly because borrowers cannot raise the complementary domestic resources
because of the recession and partly because of the level of interest rates.
Concessional finance - e.g. IDA - in real, let alone real per capita, terms
has declined and the Bank’s continued projections for its rapid doubling
36seem to confuse advocacy with the probable course of events.
Toward a Debt Crisis?
These projections are hardly reassuring. They do not suggest that recovery 
in the North is stable and especially not that South sharing in global 
recovery is certain. However, they may be too optimistic. The emergency 
debt management operations of 1982-83 have not created a stable base for 
managing developing country external debt either from the point of view of 
lenders or of borrowers.
The public projections of bankers are reassuring - as they must be to avoid
precipitating a crisis. But they assume at least 3% real North growth,
sharp falls in real interest rates and stability or recovery in the terms of
trade for primary products. The more perceptive statements make quite clear
that these are conditions for avoiding crisis - a rerun of 1979-82 real
interest rates, terms of trade and limited export growth would cause very
37much less manageable conditions.
The problem is compounded by the fact that data on problematic short term
16
credit - especially arrears on credits from manufacturers and merchants - is 
very incomplete and not included in most world debt tables. For a 
significant number of developing countries it exceeds one year’s exports. 
For half of Sub-Saharan African IMF members arrears are believed by the Fund 
to be substantial - and attempts at rescheduling and/or Fund programme 
negotiation usually show shaky short term bank lines of credit and 
commercial arrears to be far larger than anyone realised.
The private views of bankers and those of bank linked analysts are 
g l o o m i e r . T h e y  see a need for a minimum of $20-30 and probably a level of 
$50-60 billion^ of annual net lending to developing countries to the end of 
the decade (the latter roughly consistent with the Bank’s main projection). 
They are not willing to lend at those rates, especially unless and until, 
South export growth and real interest rate falls increase their confidence 
that the new debt can be serviced. Between 1981 and 1983 net private medium 
and long term lending to developing countries with current account deficits 
fell from $36.5 billion to $20.9 billion and is projected to remain static 
in 1984.^ They are aware that under these circumstances a random shock or 
a misjudged rescheduling (juggling?) act or a micro-successful cut and run 
by smaller banks could trigger a series of de facto defaults which could not 
be papered over.
The other risk - again one of which bankers are well aware and will admit to 
in private - is that developing countries will be pushed so hard that they 
will either be forced to default or will view it as advantageous to do so.
Debt service ratios to exports for all developing countries reached 20% in 
1982 while in 1983 debt service plus remitted profits averaged nearly 30% of 
exports for debtor developing c o u n t r i e s . I n  other words over one dollar
17
in four earned by exports was not available to purchase imports but had to 
go to service foreign debt and equity. For countries whose imports have 
already been forced below the levels needed to sustain reasonable levels of 
capacity utilisation and maintenance (including major ones like Brazil and 
Mexico as well as smaller ones like most of those in Sub-Saharan Africa) 
this burden is unlikely to be economically sustainable and even more
unlikely to be politically acceptable for an indefinite period. For many 
countries - including former prime borrowers like the Ivory Coast - they are
hpover 35?. Even for countries like Tanzania which never had substantial 
access to commercial credit, assuming paying off arrears over five years and 
meeting current supplier credit, Bank, Fund and official debt obligations 
can yield debt service to export ratios well over 50?. For the most heavily 
indebted with a high proportion of short maturity loans the ratio is over 
100?. In the 1960’s 10? was thought a prudent level and even in the 1970’s 
anything above 15? tended to be seen as risky.
Stabilisation programmes which concentrate - or are seen to concentrate - on
raising exports to meet debt while cutting imports, domestic output and
43public services for the indefinite future are likely to trigger far more 
energetic responses of major debtors - singly and, more ominously, jointly - 
than the very mild Latin American mutterings of late 1983 and early in 
1984. If interest plus principal repayments exceed new credit extended 
and the price of that new credit is unending austerity, then even on very 
conservative criteria there is a case for debt repudiation. Even more there 
is a likelihood of overwhelming pressure to do so from a broad spectrum of 
sub-classes including externally indebted domestic capitalists.
45The ’’success” of the Mexican rescheduling and rescue may seem to belie
this picture. But Mexico could cut imports 40? in 1982 without major
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structural damage because it had raised them 80£ in the two previous years. 
Even in that case social and political stability are at grave risk unless 
198*1 shows some growth and the balance of the decade rates averaging above 
population growth.
Brazil is more typical. It cannot cut imports further without disastrous
results on exports as well as domestic production. It can achieve a large
trade surplus but not one adequate even to pay interest at current rates.
The revised 1983-84 stabilisation programme has been pushed through the
political process only with grave difficulty. And it is probably inadequate
to cope with 1984 and 1985 gross borrowing requirements. Further pressure -
46and continued nil growth - will precipitate a crisis. Reversal from the
apertura toward a pluralist, moderately democratic state to a national
security state might be possible and suppress resistance to austerity, but
it would be unpopular enough and - more to the point - generate disruptions
enough to cause failure to meet export and external balance targets. The
continuation of apertura would require increasingly nationalist,
neo-populist resistance to creditors which would be likely to trigger a de
facto default or even a formal repudiation. The senior banker who remarked
that he and his colleagues were pressing Brazil so hard they were likely to
break the government and then where would they be was pointing to a very
real possibility, as the recent campaigning by the Vice President for the
47ruling party’s presidential nomination underlines.
Certainly a rerun of the 1930’s consequences of a global credit collapse is 
still unlikely. The North would seek to bail its banks out to the extent 
necessary to prevent domestic collapse into depression and would probably 
succeed. That is cold comfort - negative North growth rates and full 
fledged South depression would ensue. The ghost of the Kredit Anstalt is
knocking at the door.
Or as the Financial Times put it:
it would be a mistake to conlude from this agreeable 
(Brazilian) quadrille that the whole epic has now 
reached a happy ending. (Lenders and borrowers) have 
so far succeeded in buying time... It is doubtful, 
however, whether the present arrangements have bought 
enough time for all the countries concerned or can be 
used to buy much more in the future.
From ’Stabilisation' to What? ’Sustainable Growth* or ’Common Crisis*?
The evidence that the present recovery is weak and uneven is fairly clear. 
Even more critical questions are: First, whether the recovery is likely to 
continue and to become ’sustainable growth’; Second - to the extent that 
this is in doubt - whether the IMF-USA orthodoxy on adjustment (perhaps best 
styled ’recovery by contraction’) and the related World Bank structural 
adjustment othodoxy are likely to decrease or increase the risk of an 
aborted recovery.
There are several serious questions about the viability of the recovery some
general and some with specific relevance to the Third World or its ”ieast
49developed” and other ”low” and ’’lower middle” income members. The first 
is the probable consequences of low growth rates of world trade. There 
appears to be near unanimity that recovery cannot be sustained without
48
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significant increases in world trade nor the depression in many developing
51countries ended without sharp growth of their exports.
Edward Brau of the Exchange and Trade Relations Department of the IMF
recently stressed that import reductions in the developing countries are not
a solution; that getting their economies back on a growth path is critical
to their ability to repay their debts and that to do so they must both
52increase exports and have access to additional financing. In practice the
present reality for many ldc's is the inverse of Mr. Brau’s posited
requirements. The results are desparate attempts to develop compensation
trade and to hammer unwelcome imports into developed economy markets on
54terms described by the latter as dumping.
The results are declines or very slow growth in the exports of all but a
handful of ldc’s resulting in a drag on global and industrial economy trade
55expansion. Conversely:
In the industrial world, meanwhile resentment is
growing about the borrowing countries’ sometimes 
ruthless efforts to boost exports and cut imports into 
compliance with targets agreed by the IMF.
The second negative factor is high real interest rates. As noted above
these deter enterprise investment generally and are used to prop up very 
unstable US external account and government deficit positions. For Third 
World countries they have meant a sharp rise in debt service ratios and a 
significant reduction in import capacity. Both a creation of productive 
capacity side and on that of achieving external balance consistent with
growth in both imports and exports the present rates and the probability of
*50
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their continuing are very negative influences. There is no real probability 
of their declining significantly and staying down until both the US budget 
deficit and the degree of overvaluation of the dollar are significantly 
reduced.
From the low growth of trade and heavy debt service burden comes the very 
real risk of involuntary or willed open default by a significant number of 
Latin American, Asian, Central European and African countries. The dangers 
this would entail have already been sketched above.
A vicious circle of low growth in trade, rising protectionism, high
government deficits and high interest rates seems to be a very real danger.
This is most immediately true for developing countries but because they are
the markets for a quarter of capitalist industrial economy exports,
stagnation or curtailment of import levels by them will tend to create the
same vicious circle in the industrial economies. It is not surprising that
both business and labour delegates to a recent OECD meeting expressed grave
56fears that the 1979-82 depression would re-emerge as early as 19 8 6-8 8.
How do the international economic policy prescriptions peddled and acted on 
(at least for others) by the Reagan administration increase or alleviate 
these threats to sustained recovery? Because the US - along with Federal 
Germany, the Netherlands and, less consistently or extremely, the UK - has 
given its full backing to the International Monetary Fund "stabilisation" 
model earlier styled ’recovery by contraction' it is helpful to look at that 
model in these terms as well as the partially complementary and partly 
divergent "structural adjustment" model of the World Bank.
To date root and branch criticism of these models has been dismissed as
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either apocalyptic or unrealistic, while detailed critiques seeking reforms
within the IMF and World Bank’s existing parameters are either treated as
57 58 basically supportive or dismissed as being about quite secondary matters
- neither of which is necessarily a correct perception.
The IMF stabilisation model is fairly well known. It starts from the
premise that serious imbalance comes from recent (or in extreme cases 
prolonged) excessive increases in demand and can be redressed by contraction 
of demand with cuts concentrated on comsumption in the short run allowing 
sustained investment (from domestic savings and increased external
investment or loans) to restore sustainable growth in the medium or long 
term. It is a model which is largely monetarist (in the broad sense) and 
sees prices (and therefore both devaluation and trade liberalisation) as 
crucial to (indeed almost adequate for) economic management.
This model suffers from certain defects which are more acute in the South
59and in prolonged recessions:
1. contraction of import capacity is as common a cause of imbalance
as overexpansion of demand. Falls in real export earnings and
rises in debt service costs have caught earned import capacity in 
a vice precisely as finance to cover deficits become less 
available;
2. to treat imbalance resulting from the impact of global recession
on national import capacity by imposing further demand cuts seems
somewhat perverse and hardly conducive to global r e c o v e r y ; a 
point which the IMF endorses at global level but does not follow 
in determing its country programmes and therefore its actual
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provision of finance;
3. indeed to view restored global trade growth as the engine of 
recovery - as the IMF increasingly does^"1 and to prescribe import 
cuts as a standard part of programmes involving over forty 
countries appears to be to fall into a fallacy of composition (or 
decomposition);
with substantially less than full employment globally (and in 
most IMF clients) and with clients' imports constrained by 
exports plus net borrowing (or aid) it is not clear that 
unselective trade liberalisation by developing countries 
increases world trade or production but fairly clear that it is 
likely to decrease domestic production;
5. devaluations - especially large, "shock" devaluations as
prescribed by the IMF - have at least as much capacity for
increasing inflation and ending with the same relative prices and
income distribution as before at new price levels which cancel
62the devaluation's effective exchange rate results (and block 
the expected result of increasing exports) unless the economy is 
fairly flexible in production and/or products 'released' by 
contraction of domestic demand are actually exportable. In many 
developing country neither condition is met so that large 
devaluations tend to lead to the need for more devaluations 
rather than to the achievement of greater external balance 
through enhanced exports;
6. even in cases of initial success, IMF programmes seem to have a 
record of curing symptoms rather than structural problems, i.e. 
their suppression of demand is not backed by increases in supply 
and when austerity is relaxed, the same imbalances re-emerge;
7. because of the excess demand assumption as to causation of 
imbalance, IMF programmes are both relatively short (structural 
adjustment in a developing country, especially in a context of 
global recession can rarely be achieved in three years) and 
usually pay no more than lip service to supply expansion.
In fairness to the IMF, several of its major members - notably the USA and 
Federal Germany - take rather more rigid positions in favour of its model 
than it does. In an increasing number of cases it has recognized that
import capacity expansion is a necessary starting point for stabilisaton. 
However, major modifications of the model to meet this criticism and more 
especially those relating to increased emphasis on supply enhancement and 
longer programmes (say up to five years of drawings plus three years grace 
and five repayment) would require expansion of Fund resources on a scale 
substantially above the current quota increases and Western European/Saudi 
borrowing and/or greater commercial bank willingness to respond to IMF 
programmes by substantial net new lending. These problems are exacerbated 
where - as in the least developed countries and many other Sub-Saharan 
African ones - the IMF is more a lender of first (or only) than of last 
resort.
Perhaps a more telling criticism is the IMF’s recent record - especially in 
Africa. On its own assessment of 28 programmes more than half failed to 
meet their targets.^3 jn only 5 of 23 countries was the growth target met
2H
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and in only 11 of 23 the trade balance target. In most cases the programmes
did not run their full course with the commonest cause being breaking of the
64government borrowing ceiling.
The World Bank's structural adjustment model is significantly different 
from - and in principle complementary to - the Fund's stabilisation one. 
The assumed complementarity leads to Bank insistence on an IMF programme as 
a precondition for a structural adjustment programme and the divergence to a 
certain incompatability between the Fund's stress on demand contraction and 
macro monetary targets and the Bank’s on supply enhancement and sectoral and 
micro (as well as macro) real, institutional and relative price targets.
•
Because the Bank does act on a distinctly less homogenous view of the world, 
its model is less easy to characterize briefly. Three main strands - 
stressed in the 1981 Accelerated Development for Sub-Saharan Africa - An 
Agenda for Action^  and the 1982 and 1983 World Development Reports^  are:
a. reducing price distortion as a sovereign remedy for all economic 
ills;
b. increasing outward orientation and static comparative advantage 
even if this means emphasizing products with poor growth of 
demand and terms of trade prospects;
c. reduction of the scope of the public sector plus (a shift in 
emphasis over 1981-83) more efficient management of public policy 
and public enterprises;
d. low emphasis on equity, distribution and basic services questions
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partly on a production comes first and partly on a neo-trickle 
down basis.
The Accelerated Development variant has run into a blizzard (or perhaps
67sandstorm) of criticism. In general the critics do not deny the
importance of most of the Bank's points - primary export big pushes and an 
apparent ambivalence on concern with food self sufficiency are exceptions. 
At a case by case level few would deny the need for improved public sector 
efficiency (including some reduction in activities attempted) or the need to 
manage prices better albeit many find the Bank's approach to both subjects 
both simplistic and ultimately ideological. But they query whether the 
report really is an agenda for action, whether it has not glossed over 
issues at least as important as the ones it stresses and whether it really 
has a coherent set of priorities as opposed to a rather simplistic set of 
stereotyped or semi stereotyped programmes derived from general first 
principles and backed by somewhat random examples.
The Bank's 1983 emphasis on price distortion is in danger of falling under
the same type of criticism. First, arguably many of the distortions are the
result of (rather than the cause of) crises. Second, the correlation with
GDP growth is not particularly high. Third, the rankings are both on an
unsophisticated basis and open to very considerable argument especiallly in
68respect to some of the countries - e.g. Malawi - which receive very low 
price distortion ratings.
The Bank does appear to have considered and acted on some criticisms more
than the Fund - how far is hard to say as the Bank almost never openly
admits to error and is quite capable of putting a gloss on policy statements
reverses what they were formerly understood to mean. It clearly has
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upgraded food self sufficiency, accepted improved public sector efficiency 
as a more generally attainable goal than massive privatisation, become much 
more sceptical on primary product export led growth and - perhaps - admitted 
that efficient import substitution is as adequate a strategy (or strategic 
component) as outward orientation (which seems to be viewed as by definition 
efficient).^
However, at times Bank flexibility becomes incoherence. It lauds Brazils
70breakthrough to manufactured exports and even its long preparation by 
rather ad hoc protectionism responding to particular private enterprise 
pressures'^ and South Korea’s^2 detailed interventionism down to product and 
enterprise level. Neither seems to square very well with its general policy 
prescriptions and the approval of Brazil's handling of import substitution 
and domestic economic integration as the Bank describes it is clearly open 
to very sharp criticism from neo-classical, pragmatic and Marxian 
perspectives.
Even more serious, the Bank - like the Fund - does not have the resources to 
cover the added cost to countries of implementing fullscale structural 
adjustment programmes without collapsing in the process. This is in one 
sense not its fault - neither the constrictions on IDA resources nor the 
very sluggish growth in bilateral availabilities is the Bank’s wish. But, 
to take the Sub-Saharan African region, to propose policies to 40 odd 
countries when the resources to back serious structural adjustment 
programmes will cover perhaps 10 has a certain element of irresponsibility 
about it. What if 20 set out to follow policies viable only with Bank and 
Bank mobilised support?
The Bank model might produce structural adjustment in the Third World
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conducive to sustainable recovery if:
a. substantial increases in official and private capital transfers 
at relatively low real interest rates were provided;
b. industrial economies reversed their trend toward protectionism 
and increased their openness to developing economy (including 
Newly Industrialising Economy, i.e. NIC) exports;
c. the IMF in practice favoured country programmes based on supply
expansion as well as demand control and targeted on increases in 
both imports and exports, increased the volume of its own 
resources to back such programmes markedly and leaned on
bilateral aid agencies and commercial lenders to provide 
increased finance until the trade recovery process had become 
firmly rooted.
Unfortunately none of these conditions seems, at present, likely to be met. 
The greatest single obstacle to their attainment is the present US
administration. It backs the most restrictionist elements in the Bank and 
Fund models, limits Fund quota and IDA pledge levels below what other
industrial economies see as appropriate and combines verbal advocacy of free 
trade with steady erosion of access to US markets for the exports of
developing and industrialized economies.
Toward An Alternative Recovery And Development Strategy
The costs of the 1979-82 depression are well known - and to some extent
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or level at least as evident to men and women in the street or factory or on 
the farm as to academicians or journalists or political decision takers. 
Despite 'brave* words, it is clear that the present recovery is weak, uneven 
and by no means certain to be sustained. A hard look at the global 
political economic models which now dominate global economic policy - those 
of the present US administration, the IMF and the World Bank - suggests that 
they are in significant respects more likely to prevent than further the 
transmission of recovery to the Third World and more generally are hardly 
well adapted at operational level to achieving the increased trade and 
capital resource transfer expansion they posit as necessary for sustained 
global ecoomic growth. The combination of these factors strongly suggests 
that strategic alternatives should be explored - at the least for ensuring
consolidation of recovery and structural adjustment consistent with renewed
73development.
In fact alternatives have been explored. The most coherent and
comprehensive presentations are those of the Brandt Commission - Programme
74For Survival - and of the Commonwealth Secretariat's Helleiner Commission
r y  ZT
- Towards A New Bretton Woods. All are the product of commissions of 
eminent individuals drawn from the worlds of politics, business and academia 
as well as from developed and developing countries. None is a radical 
document - except by comparison with the present orthodox consolidation and 
adjustment models which seem to have found scant favour with commission 
members. Each has an avowed special concern with developing economies 
because they are the weakest, the hardest hit by the 1979-82 depression and 
thus the weakest links in sustaining recovery in an economically 
interdependent world. In addition the Brandt reports overtly and Helleiner 
report less explicitly, but perhaps no less firmly, do see development and 
economic advance of popr people as moral imperatives.
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The proposals of Common Crisis and Towards A New Bretton Woods (which may be
77somewhat unfortunately titled ) are primarily focussed on winning out of 
recession and sustaining recovery rather than to broader and deeper systemic 
restructuring. Very few of their proposals would require new institutional 
fora - substantial, but hardly revolutionary, changes within existing ones 
would serve. From these and other studies a draft alternative strategy 
which should in principle be negotiable, practicable if negotiated and more 
productive than the present ones can relatively easily be drawn up.
Trade expansion must receive more than lip service and the new protectionism 
more than rhetorical denunication. In particular discrimination against 
exports of developing countries including NICs should be ended and, at least 
for the vast majority of ldc’s, preferences given my Northern economies.
For this to be acceptable, safeguards which were genuinely non-discrimin- 
atory, related to serious harm caused by imports, time limited and 
non-renewable and subject to some impartial adjudication or arbitration 
process are needed. For the process to be better managed and negotiated, it 
would be desirable for the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
(intellectually conservative and widely perceived as a "rich man’s club") 
and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s trade functions 
(widely seen as an "unrealistic forum all talk and no action") to be merged.
The IMF’s role as the linchpin of the international monetary system requires 
strengthening (e.g. by issues of SDRs increasing that assets share in 
reserves) and by altering its stance to a more supply enhancement (as 
opposed to demand reduction), realistic (as to social, political and human 
costs and benefits) contextually (as to country) and flexibly (as to ways
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and instruments for proceeding toward agreed targets over practicable time 
periods) oriented one. The number of technical and operational proposals 
for achieving this are myriad - the problem is securing agreement to any 
basic change. To carry out this enlarged and altered role the IMF would 
need substantially (probably 50 to 100$ in the short term) increased 
resources.
In respect to the World Bank more IDA funding (at say $16 billion not $9 for 
the forthcoming period) is probably the first priority and a greater 
willingness to explore alternative priorities and instruments and to admit 
its own past errors the second. For most bilateral aid agencies roughly 
similar checklists apply.
Commercial finance needs to be available at lower real interest rates (which 
almost certainly requires radically lower US budgetary and trade deficits) 
and for debtor Third World countries in amounts and with repayment schedules 
that allow consolidation of their economic base, restoration of growth and - 
thereby - ability to service existing and new debt.
Debt burdens need to be viewed jointly with trade and access to new funds.
The greater the latter two, the less the need to reduce the former by formal
or de facto (e.g. lowering interest and stretching repayment) writeoffs.
But partial writeoffs in some cases are needed if the countries are to
78recover and if the lenders are to recover anything.
Food - and the abolition of hunger - require more coherent national food and 
hunger strategies (especially but not only in ldc's - hunger in the USA and 
dumped sugar and beef exports from EEC are hardly examples of policies to be 
recommended). It also requires substantially greater selective support from
32
industrial economies in respect to food, production inputs and knowledge 
development. Closely related is a need to reprioretize aid toward poverty 
reduction and toward averting economic disintegration (a very real 
possibility in at least a score of African economies).
While development of South-South links is basically a South issue, it can be 
facilitated by Northern cooperation, e.g. technical assistance and financial 
support to specific regional initiatives.
Last but by no means least is re-establishing agreed rules of the game (e.g.
in GATT where the industrial economies have largely eroded the old code of
conduct as it pertained to ldc's and are now turning on each other) and more
effective joint management of the international economy. To be acceptable
79the rules must be negotiated by bodies in which the South is represented 
and the management must be, and be seen to be, responsible and accessible to 
all members of the global economic system.
This list is evidently both condensed and global. In operation it would 
need articulation to meet the needs of specific groups of countries - e.g. 
low income - and indeed specific states. However, that step logically 
follows agreement that serious negotiation of an alternative strategy is on 
the global economic agenda - an agreement which does not now exist.
"Not with a bang but with a whimper”?
The crucial requirement today at global level is not to devise proposals 
which would reduce the risks inherent in present dominant models and trends 
while leading to more sustainable recovery and development. There are
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almost too many already.
Nor is it primarily to have them seen as made by sober, serious people. 
Neither Willy Brandt nor Professor Helleiner, Jeremy Morse nor Philip 
Ndegwa, Edward Heath nor Amir Jamal is perceived as a ’wild man’. They are 
respectable and -on the whole - respected practising politicians, bankers 
and academicians, by and large very much men of affairs and not of ivory 
towers.
The problem is to get a serious hearing for these proposals from Northern 
decision takers. Otherwise - to paraphrase T. S. Eliot - this is the way
the dialogue ends, not with a bang but with a whimper. There seem to be
five main reasons for this failure:
1. uncertainty in the North as to what has hit them leading to a
negative risk avoidance strategy of rejecting untried or new 
proposals, a factor reinforced by 1983’s partial recovery which 
leads pragmatic as well as ideological conservatives to share the
small child’s wish "to keep tight hold of nurse for fear of
something worse";
2. the substitution of dogma for pragmatic economic strategy in the
United States and - to a lesser extent - the United Kingdom:
3. the rise of the new anti-welfarism (whether jubilantly proclaimed
or sadly accepted) domestically within the North;
4. the fact that Northern interdependence means that no approach not 
backed by at le^st two out of EEC, Japan and the United States
34
and to some extent acquiesced in by the third is likely to prove 
practicable;
5. the absence of any broad body of informed public opinion on
global economic issues and strategies.
80Does this mean accepting the argument that:
The hard fact is that industrialised countries will
only become interested...when the costs of hanging on 
to the present crumbling system become too high...we 
will have to wait until unemployment rises above the 
toleration threshold, or the Third World' debt crisis 
becomes unmanageable.
There is a strong case for not doing so. Worse is better approaches have a
high immediate human cost and a rather uncertain probability of achieving
the better. True, the economic collapses of the late 1920’s and 1930’s did 
lead to Bretton Woods and a quarter century of relatively stable economic 
growth which - whatever its limitations - was better than any earlier 
documented quarter century. But what lay in between?
At least four strategic elements are required:
1. continued presentation of reasoned cases for alternatives to as 
many Northern decision takers as possible;
2. avoidance - or at least reduction - of factional disputes among 
the advocates of substantial change. The desertion of half the 
Brandt Report’s natural constituency under banners of ”no
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reformism, a new order now” and "don’t mix morality with economic 
interest” seriously weakened its impact;
3. building up broadly based development and global economic
education. It is no accident that Scandinavia and the 
Netherlands which are the most active countries on the
development education front are among those with the greatest 
decision taker willingness to consider alternatives and criticise 
present dominant models and to do so with confidence that such 
action is, on balance, likely to have a positive political
payoff. Since most Northern governments show little sign of 
movement in this direction, the burden would seem initially to 
fall on voluntary bodies;
4. use the educational effort to secure commitment to alternatives
(and to pressing that commitment on political decision takers) by
existing mass organisation, e.g. trade unions, churches, minority
group organisations, not simply by rather small specialist
development groups. This is by no means impossible, many of
these groups do accept that global economic policy and
developemnt alternatives at least of the nature of major reforms
are needed. What is usually lacking is a sense that such changes
are of substantial significance to their own membership - until
"common interest” is perceived in that way, the commitments will
be of low priority in posing (or pressing) priorities to decision
takers. These are groups which do influence Northern decision
81takers - at least to the extent of getting a serious hearing.
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"We Who Are Only Undefeated Because We Have Gone On Trying"
The strategy and tactics of achieving an alternative appraoch to
international economic consolidation, adjustment, recovery and sustained
development are neither trivial nor a minor appendix to the strategy and
tactics of the alternative approach. Nor are they necessarily best
analysed, let alone implemented, by international political economy 
82specialists.
Failure to recognise those facts has hampered much campaigning for strategic 
alternatives. It is cruel, but fair, to say that there have been repeated 
tendencies to act as if Joshua before the walls of Jericho or Saint Paul on 
the Damascas Road could be seen as the role models for the campaigners and 
their targets.
Four thematic tags may illustrate key elements for orgnisational and process
building strategy.®^ "Freedom is the right understanding of necessity" - it
is both critical to show the necessity of change and to demonstrate that 
what is proposed is within the limits of the possible. "Who makes two 
blades of grain to grow where only one grew before deserves well..." - it is 
critical to relate to concrete objective correlatives which can be seen as 
meeting the basic human needs of actual persons (especially those one seeks 
to organize). "In the long run we are all dead" - practical political 
mobilisation must seek to deliver results reasonably speedily not 
concentrate on eschatological ideals and ignore that survival and 
consolidation are preconditions for adjustment and development. "What is to 
be done?" - on the basis of necessity, priority concrete requirements and a 
process of partial successes what action (and organisation) programme
strategy and tactics makes good sense?
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How it is possible to act on the themes is contextual. Organising 
possibilities and necessities in particular national and group contexts vary 
just as much as the impact of the 1979-82 depression or the concrete actions 
necessary to consolidate and recover. The USA is neither Sweden nor 
Tanzania. The State of Washington is not Washington D.C. Trade unions are 
not churches and neither is a single theme, middle class, intellectual 
action group.
To be effective organisation toward "recovery for all" needs to embody six 
characteristics:
1. inclusiveness - i.e. going beyond specialists and specialized 
organisations to encompass a diversity of people and of
I
organisations who come to see international political economic 
relations as one of the concerns important to themselves because 
it is linked to their other (and often to them more basic) 
concerns;
2. breadth - i.e. making clear that "adjustment" and "recovery" are 
not asceptic, isolated intellectual abstractions but have 
immediate, living ocnnections with other issues, e.g. 
unemployment, peace, justice;
3. Immediacy - i.e. demonstrating that there are particular policy, 
action and relation changes which can (and should) be achieved 
immediately in the context of crisis/weak recovery not deferred 
for ’better days’ because putting them off is likely to ensure 
that the ’better days’ do not materialize;
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4. Process orientation - i.e. putting the particular in a broader
context both in starting from persons’ and organisations’ actual 
present concerns and consciousnesses and in recognising that 
while ’’even the longest journey starts with the first step" the 
direction of that first step matters and depends on some insight 
into where the journey is intended to lead;
5. Practical - i.e. organising to achieve changes in actions,
relationships and attitudes and, therefore, using a range of
tactics from lobbying in corridors of power through broad 
organisation pressure (e.g. electoral?) for structural changes to 
direct ngo action:
6. Both idealistic and pragmatic - ie.e. remembering that it is not
by any means true that what is normatively justifiable must be 
against ones own interests (nor vice versa) and that all 
organisations (and individuals) are limited, imperfect and in 
part bounded by the necessity of protecting their own interests.
Elements in elaborating an organisational and action programme 
flow from the foregoing concerns and are likely to be at several 
levels. Employment (including relating increased employment in 
production for export to actual adjustment to meet the needs of 
those whose employment is lost as a result of structural changes 
including imports); coherent fiscal (tighter? via tax reform?) 
and monetary (less restrictive?) policy and practice; peace (the 
direct cost of military spending - the fiscal and monetary 
implications - the interaction between militarism and economic
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viability/development); poverty (moral and practical economic 
causes, consequences); hunger (production, distribution, broader 
consequences aspects); Third World development or stagnation/ 
disintegration (feedback to North in terms of recovery prospects 
and military/peace issues as well as normative concerns) are all 
examples of topics which are likely to deserve significant 
attention.
Each topic needs to be seen in the context of the concerns of a broad range 
of individuals and organisations grouping people. These include unions,
churches, labour and Christian action groups (not by any means identical to 
the preceeding categories), minority group organisations (including women 
and youth bodies), politcal parties, single theme bodies focussed on other 
topics (e.g. peace), single theme international economic reform/development/ 
Third World organisations. How and why "recovery for all" is immediate and 
important to and for them varies significantly. The problem for 
organisation and mobilisation is identifying that how and why and assisting 
the organisation and its members to identify it for themselves.
In doing so it is critical not to hide, nor encourage others to hide,
tensions, costs and conflicts of interest. "Recovery for all" cannot be
costless. The problems of ex-steelworkers and ex-steel centred communities 
whether in Ohio or Lorraine are real and deserve as serious attention as 
those of present and potential Zimbabwean steelworkers and their town of 
Redcliffe. The necessity is to seek to resolve conflicts in ways which 
broaden support for and the payoff from "recovery for all" rather than
narrowing backing and eroding gains. Real alternatives for Ohioans and 
Lorrainers are an example of the former route while both dumping them on 
their own scrapheaps and beating back Zimbabwe steel with disciminatory
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quotas/duties are examples of the latter.
Organising coalitions to achieve basic change is - like most other 
worthwhile endeavours - not an easy, speedy or certain process. But it is
the way basic changes are usually achieved (whether within, or by radically
altering, existing institutions and power relationships). Immediate partial 
successes are important to survival of the process (and in the case of 
"recovery for all" for the survial of the recovery and - quite literally - 
of the lives of many human beings) and are usually attainable, but until 
broader and deeper change is achieved they will remain very partial and - 
even more critical - at high risk of reversal.
In the immediate context whatever else the first Brandt Commission report 
had wrong one of its conclusions is both true and, because true, poses an
imperative reason for going on with the effort:
The search for solutions is not an act of benevolence
but a condition of mutual survival. We believe it is 
dramatically urgent today to start taking practical 
steps.
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